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A	Modest	Proposal?			Regulating	Customer	Discrimination	Through	the	Firm	
Naomi	Schoenbaum*
I.	 A	MODEST	PROPOSAL?	...................................................................................................	102	II. THE	DOWNSIDES	OF	REGULATING	CUSTOMERS	THROUGH	THE	FIRM	.....................	105III. HOLDING	FIRMS	ACCOUNTABLE	FOR	PRIVACY-BASED	BIASES	................................	108IV. CONCLUSION	.....................................................................................................................	110Antidiscrimination	law	appears	to	be	of	two	minds.	The	law	aggressively	polices	 discrimination	 in	 some	 realms,	 while	 leaving	 other	 realms	 to	 be	governed	by	 the	preferences	of	 their	participants.1	 In	 their	essay,	Professors	Katharine	Bartlett	and	Mitu	Gulati	suggest	recalibrating	the	boundaries	of	this	area	of	law	so	that	it	covers	discrimination	in	an	area	that	the	law	now	leaves	largely	up	to	the	realm	of	personal	preference:	discrimination	by	customers.2			Even	 if	 there	 is	 agreement	 that	 the	 law	 should	 regulate	 customer	discrimination,	 how	 should	 it	 do	 so?	 While	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 consider	 a	direct	ban	on	discrimination	by	customers,	they	reject	this	approach	in	favor	of	regulating	firms	for	two	primary	reasons:	(1)	the	increased	efficacy	of	firm	liability	and	(2)	concern	with	infringing	on	customer	privacy	and	autonomy.3		Bartlett	and	Gulati	propose	that	“entities	that	already	have	a	 legal	obligation	not	 to	 discriminate	 .	.	.	 also	 should	 have	 an	 explicit	 obligation	 to	 curtail	 and	not	 to	 facilitate	 discrimination	 by	 their	 customers,	 and	 to	 refrain	 from	
* I	thank	Michael	Abramowicz,	Katharine	Bartlett,	and	Mitu	Gulati	 for	offering	generousfeedback	on	a	draft	of	this	response.		1. Compare	 42	 U.S.C.	 §	 2000e-2(a)(2)	 (2012)	 (banning	 discrimination	 in	 employment),
with	Elizabeth	F.	Emens,	Intimate	Discrimination:	The	State’s	Role	in	the	Accidents	of	Sex	and	Love,	122	HARV.	L.	REV.	1307,	1309–15	(2009)	(explaining	how	the	 law	does	not	 intervene	to	prevent	discrimination	in	romantic	relationships).	2. See	generally	Katharine	T.	Bartlett	&	Mitu	Gulati,	Discrimination	by	Customers,	102	IOWA	L.	REV.	223	(2016).		3. Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	227.
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102	 IOWA	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	102:nnn	discrimination	when	 they,	 themselves,	 act	 in	 the	 role	 of	 a	 customer.”4	 They	would	allow	 firms	a	BFOQ-like	exception	 for	 “the	most	compelling	 instances	implicating	customer	privacy.”5		They	describe	this	proposal	as	“modest.”6			This	 Response	 considers	 the	 claim	 that	 such	 a	 proposal	 amounts	 to	 a	modest	change	in	the	law,	and	then	addresses	the	consequences	of	regulating	discrimination	 by	 customers	 through	 firms.	 As	 a	 descriptive	 matter,	 this	Response	 suggests	 that	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 negligence-like	 proposal	represents	 a	 fairly	 substantial	 break	 with	 current	 antidiscrimination	 laws	regulating	firms.	This	fact	does	not	necessarily	weigh	against	their	proposal.	A	substantial	 break	 in	 the	 law	 may	 be	 required	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 sufficiently	troubling	 problem.	 	 In	 fact,	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 work	 might	 lead	 us	 to	consider	 anew	 whether	 antidiscrimination	 law	 should	 hold	 firms	 to	 a	negligence	 standard	 in	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 circumstances.7	 As	 a	 normative	matter,	 this	 Response	 highlights	 the	 downsides	 of	 regulating	 customer	discrimination	through	firms,	 including	some	of	the	same	concerns—such	as	efficacy—that	motivate	Bartlett	and	Gulati	 to	reject	customer	 liability.	These	downsides	 do	 not	 require	 a	 rejection	 of	 firm	 liability	 in	 favor	 of	 either	customer	 liability	 or	 no	 liability.	 	 However,	 they	 must	 be	 accounted	 for	 in	considering	the	optimal	approach.	Finally,	this	Response	argues	that	allowing	firms	 too	 much	 leeway	 to	 take	 account	 of	 discriminatory	 customer	preferences	under	a	BFOQ-type	exception	 fails	 to	hold	 firms	accountable	 for	their	role	in	cultivating	these	preferences.	I. A	MODEST	PROPOSAL?	Professors	Bartlett	and	Gulati	describe	their	proposal	to	place	liability	on	firms	 to	 prevent	 customer	 discrimination	 as	 “modest.”8	 In	 their	 view,	 the	proposal	 only	 “enlarge[s]	 slightly	 the	 obligations	 that	 firms	 already	 have.”9	This	 conclusion	 comes	 after	 having	 rejected	 a	 bolder	 proposal	 to	 impose	 a	direct	 ban	 on	 discrimination	 by	 customers.	 In	 this	 relative	 regard,	 their	proposal	 is	 modest.	 But	 how	 large	 of	 a	 shift	 is	 it	 away	 from	 existing	antidiscrimination	law?			In	my	 reading,	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 proposal	 to	 hold	 firms	 liable	when	they	 “facilitate	 discrimination	 by	 their	 customers”	 and	 when	 they	 fail	 “to	curtail”	 discrimination	 by	 their	 customers	 amounts	 to	 negligence	 liability.10	Bartlett	and	Gulati	suggest	that	liability	could	arise	not	only	from	affirmative	
4. Id.	at	249.5. Id.6. Id.	at	247,	249.7. See	David	Benjamin	Oppenheimer,	Negligent	Discrimination,	141	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	899,	900	(1993)	 (cataloguing	parts	 of	 employment	discrimination	 law	 that	 already	embody	a	negligence	and	arguing	for	a	broader	embrace	of	this	theory	of	liability).	8. Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	247,	249.9. Id.	at	247.10. Id.	at	249,	251.
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2017]	 A	MODEST	PROPOSAL	 103	acts	 by	 the	 firm,	 but	 also	 from	 failures	 to	 take	 due	 care	 to	 prevent	 harm,	 a	hallmark	 of	 negligence	 liability.11	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 also	 suggest	 that	 the	touchstone	 for	 liability	would	be	 the	 reasonableness	of	 the	 firm’s	 actions	or	failures	to	act,	another	hallmark	of	negligence	liability.12					The	greatest	impact	of	this	proposal	would	appear	to	be	as	an	addendum	to	 employment	 discrimination	 law,	 as	workers	 likely	 feel	most	 of	 the	 harm	from	discrimination	by	customers.	To	be	sure,	Title	VII	already	imposes	some	liability	 on	 firms	 for	 discrimination	 by	 customers.13	 	 Nonetheless,	 imposing	liability	 on	 a	 firm	 for	 failing	 to	 take	 due	 care	 with	 regard	 to	 facilitating	 or	curtailing	 discrimination	 seems	 quite	 far	 from	 the	 heartland	 of	antidiscrimination	 law,	 which	 generally	 addresses	 intentional	discrimination.14	 Although	 scholars	 have	 acknowledged	 that	 aspects	 of	 Title	VII	allow	for	liability	on	the	basis	of	employer	negligence,	these	are	exceptions	rather	than	the	rule.15			Perhaps	 most	 relevant	 to	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 proposal	 is	 work	 by	Professor	 Noah	 Zatz	 recognizing	 that	 employers	 have	 an	 affirmative	obligation	 to	 prevent	 and	 redress	 sexual	 and	 racial	 harassment	 of	 their	employees	by	customers.16	Note	that	this	is	not	a	doctrine	unique	so	much	to	discrimination	 by	 customers	 as	 it	 is	 a	 doctrine	 unique	 to	 the	 law	 of	harassment	 under	 Title	 VII,	 which	 permits	 liability	 for	 employers	 in	circumstances	that	look	like	negligence.17	Liability	for	third-party	harassment	fits	within	Title	VII’s	intentional	discrimination	rubric	because	in	these	cases	
some	party	had	discriminatory	intent,	even	if	that	party	wasn’t	the	employer		
	 11.	 See	 id.	 at	 250	 (suggesting	 that	 liability	 should	 apply	 when	 customer	 discrimination	arises	in	circumstances	“that	[firms]	could	prevent”).	
	 12.	 See	 id.	 (suggesting	 that	 liability	 should	 apply	 “when	 customer	 bias	 causes	 harm	 and	there	 are	 reasonable	 ways	 businesses	 could	 change	 their	 practices	 to	 prevent	 that	 harm”)	(emphasis	 added);	 id.	 at	 253	 (“The	 proposed	 rule	would	 only	 require	 firms	 to	 take	 reasonable	steps	calculated	to	end	the	harmful	effects	of	discrimination	by	its	customers.”)	(emphasis	added)		 13.	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 correctly	 state	 that	 “current	 law	 generally	 does	 not	 hold	 firms	accountable	 for	 customer	 discrimination	 that	 their	 own	 practices	 allow	 and	 that	 they	 could	prevent.”	Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	250.	However,	 they	also	recognize	that	employment	discrimination	 law	 regulates	 discrimination	 by	 customers	 by	 banning	 employers	 from	 taking	adverse	employment	actions	on	the	basis	of	customers’	discriminatory	preferences,	except	when	justified	 by	 a	 statutory	 exception	 under	 the	 bona	 fide	 occupational	 qualification.	 Id.	 at	 252	 &	n.120,	 253	 &	 nn.125–26.	 Employment	 discrimination	 law	 also	 addresses	 discrimination	 by	customers	 by	 requiring	 employers	 to	 take	 action	 to	 prevent	 and	 correct	 sexual	 or	 racial	harassment	 of	 employees	 by	 customers.	 See	 Noah	 D.	 Zatz,	Managing	 the	 Macaw:	 Third-Party	
Harassers,	 Accommodation,	 and	 the	 Disaggregation	 of	 Discriminatory	 Intent,	 109	 COLUM.	 L.	 REV.	1357,	1359	(2009).			 14.	 There	 is	 disparate	 impact	 liability	 in	 theory,	 but	 in	 practice	 it	 is	 quite	 limited.	 See	Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	3,	at	250;	Michael	Selmi,	Was	the	Disparate	Impact	Theory	a	Mistake?,	53	UCLA	L.	REV.	701,	738–40	(2006).			
	 15.	 See	generally	Oppenheimer,	supra	note	8;	Zatz,	supra	note	13.		
	 16.	 See	generally	Zatz,	supra	note	13.		 17.	 Title	 VII	 places	 negligence-like	 liability	 on	 employers	 to	 prevent	 harassment	 by	coworkers	and	not	just	customers.	See	Oppenheimer,	supra	note	7,	at	944–67.		
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104	 IOWA	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	102:nnn	itself.18	Bartlett	and	Gulati’s	proposal	is	broader,	not	requiring	any	showing	of	discriminatory	 intent	by	anyone,	 as	 a	 firm	surely	 could	 “facilitate”	 customer	discrimination	before	 any	 customer	 ever	 acts	 on	 it.	 This	 type	 of	 negligence-like	 liability	could,	at	 least	 in	theory,	greatly	expand	the	realm	of	 liability	for	employment	discrimination.		Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 don’t	 discuss	 how	 their	 proposed	 liability	would	 be	enforced.	They	suggest	 that	 liability	would	be	 imposed	“when	customer	bias	causes	 harm.”19	 Because	 the	 persons	 most	 often	 harmed	 by	 customer	discrimination	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 workers,	 limits	 on	 standing	 would	 probably	play	some	role	in	restricting	the	expanded	scope	of	liability.			Aside	from	expanding	the	scope	of	 liability,	a	shift	to	negligence	liability	for	 discrimination	 by	 customers	 would	 mean	 that	 employers	 are	 held	 to	 a	higher	standard	when	addressing	discrimination	by	customers	than	they	are	for	 other	 forms	 of	 discrimination,	 including	 discrimination	 that	 originates	within	 the	 firm	 itself.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 unconscious	 coworker	 biases,	which	can	lead	some	coworkers	to	not	provide	support	to	their	minority	and	female	 colleagues	 in	 ways	 that	make	 it	 harder	 for	 them	 to	 advance,	 or	 can	infect	their	evaluations	of	their	minority	and	female	colleagues.	Under	current	law,	 so	 long	as	 the	employee	cannot	 show	that	discriminatory	 intent	 caused	an	adverse	employment	action,	which	they	would	be	hard-pressed	to	do	in	the	circumstances	described,	such	claims	are	not	actionable.20	Under	Bartlett	and	Gulati’s	proposal,	an	employer	who	failed	to	take	reasonable	steps	to	address	such	discrimination	by	customers	could	be	held	liable.					Of	 course,	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 are	 only	 tackling	 the	 problem	 of	discrimination	by	customers.	It	 is	fair	that	their	proposal	only	addresses	this	problem.		But	why	should	workers	who	interact	with	customers	be	protected	under	 the	 far	 more	 expansive	 standard	 of	 employer	 negligence?	 Perhaps	these	 workers	 have	 made	 themselves	 vulnerable	 to	 additional	 sources	 of	discrimination,	 and	 thus	 they	 need	 additional	 protection.21	 	 Nonetheless,	negligence	liability	seems	like	more	than	a	modest	expansion	given	the	scope	of	 employers’	 obligations	 under	 current	 antidiscrimination	 law.22		Recognizing	 this	does	not	necessarily	weigh	against	 the	proposal.	 	Rather,	 it	might	 prompt	 us	 to	 consider	 whether	 the	 problem	 that	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	describe—the	 employer’s	 role	 in	 cultivating	 and	 reinforcing	 discrimination	against	workers	by	those	with	whom	workers	interact—is	a	problem	broader	than	discrimination	by	customers	and	includes	discrimination	by	coworkers,	
	
	 18.	 See	Zatz,	supra	note	13,	at	1377–80.	
	 19.	 See	Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	250.				 20.	 Disparate	impact	claims	on	these	theories	are	not	likely	to	prevail.	Id.	at	250.				 21.	 This	might	be	especially	true	for	at	least	a	subset	of	workers—intimate	workers—who	interact	with	customers	in	an	intimate	way.	See	Naomi	Schoenbaum,	The	Law	of	Intimate	Work,	90	WASH.	L.	REV.	1167,	1187–89	(2015).			 22.	 For	more	discussion	rejecting	negligence-like	liability	here,	see	id.	at	1238.	
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2017]	 A	MODEST	PROPOSAL	 105	who,	like	customers,	are	also	essential	to	workers’	employment	outcomes.23		If	employers	engage	in	similar	conduct	vis-à-vis	coworkers	and	current	law	fails	to	 address	 it,	 perhaps	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 proposal	 should	 be	 extended	 to	cover	discrimination	by	coworkers	as	well.	II. THE	DOWNSIDES	OF	REGULATING	CUSTOMERS	THROUGH	THE	FIRM	Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 effectively	 highlight	 the	 benefits	 of	 firm	 rather	 than	customer	liability,	but	they	do	less	to	highlight	the	costs.24	This	Part	takes	on	that	 task,	 not	 to	 argue	 for	 a	 rejection	 of	 firm	 liability	 in	 favor	 of	 customer	liability	 or	 no	 liability,	 but	 to	 present	 a	 fuller	 picture	 of	 the	 tradeoffs	associated	with	 assigning	 responsibility	 to	 firms	 rather	 than	 customers,	 and	to	 recognize	 challenges	 to	 be	 addressed	 if	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 proposal	 is	adopted.		I	write	from	a	sympathetic	perspective,	as	I	have	previously	written	about	 employers’	 role	 in	 cultivating	 discriminatory	 preferences.25The	following	consequences	are	ones	that	might	be	concerning	even	for	those	who	agree	 with	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 that	 the	 law	 should	 do	 more	 to	 regulate	discrimination	by	customers,	and	even	for	those	who	agree	that	firms	should	bear	responsibility.				Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 reject	 customer	 liability	 due	 in	 part	 to	 concerns	 of	efficacy.	But	 firm	 liability	 raises	 its	own	concerns	of	 efficacy.	There	 is	 a	 real	question	 as	 to	 how	 such	 claims—even	 if	 recognized	 in	 theory—will	 fare.	Scholars	 have	 long	 lamented	 the	 dismal	 success	 rates	 of	 employment	discrimination	plaintiffs.26	One	explanation	for	why	discrimination	claims	are	so	 often	 unsuccessful	 is	 that	 the	 general	 conception	 of	 what	 constitutes	wrongful	 discrimination	 is	 quite	 limited:	 “[M]ost	 people	 do	 not	 ‘see’	discrimination,	 except	 where	 there	 is	 effectively	 no	 plausible	 alternative.”27	Thus,	 expanding	 the	 scope	 of	 liability	 for	 discrimination	 far	 outside	 of	what	most	 Americans	 consider	 wrongful	 might	 not	 translate	 to	 much	 success	 in	courts,	 and	 may	 render	 these	 claims	 even	 less	 successful	 than	 typical		
	 23.	 See	 Naomi	 Schoenbaum,	 Towards	 a	 Law	 of	 Coworkers,	 68	 ALA.	 L.	 REV.	 	 605,	 613–14	(2017);	Laura	A.	Rosenbury,	Working	Relationships,	35	WASH.	U.	J.L.	&	POL’Y	117,	129–34	(2011).	Generally,	 discriminatory	 preferences	 of	 both	 customers	 and	 coworkers	 can	 lead	 to	discrimination	against	workers	even	if	the	firm	itself	has	no	“taste”	for	discrimination.	See	GARY	S.	BECKER,	THE	ECONOMICS	OF	DISCRIMINATION	55,	75	(2d	ed.	1971).				 24.	 They	indicate	that	the	biggest	drawback	of	imposing	liability	on	the	firm	rather	than	the	customer	would	be	that	some	forms	of	discrimination	by	customers	would	simply	escape	liability.	
See	Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	255	(“Perhaps	the	biggest	gap	in	the	proposed	rule	is	that	it	will	have	no	effect	on	businesses	that	customers	avoid	because	of	race	or	gender	bias	against	the	business.”).	
	 25.	 See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	21,	at	1193–96.		 26.	 Katie	 R.	 Eyer,	 That’s	 Not	 Discrimination:	 American	 Beliefs	 and	 the	 Limits	 of	 Anti-
Discrimination	 Law,	 96	 MINN.	 L.	 REV.	 1275,	 1276	 (2012)	 (noting	 that	 “less	 than	 5%	 of	 all	discrimination	plaintiffs	will	 ever	 achieve	 any	 form	of	 litigated	 relief,”	 and	 that	 “dismissals	 (on	motions	to	dismiss	or	at	summary	judgment)	are	extremely	common	in	discrimination	litigation,	accounting	for	a	full	86%	of	litigated	outcomes”).			
	 27.	 Id.	at	1278.		
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106	 IOWA	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	102:nnn	discrimination	claims.	 In	this	regard,	direct	customer	liability	might	be	more	effective	 than	 firm	 liability	 because	 judges	 and	 juries	 are	 probably	 more	inclined	 to	 fault	 the	 individual	 customer	harboring	discriminatory	 bias	 than	the	firm	that	failed	to	curtail	the	bias.28		Difficult	 line-drawing	 is	 another	 reason	 that	 Bartlett	 and	Gulati	 cite	 for	rejecting	customer	liability.29	But	shifting	from	individual	to	firm	liability	does	not	 avoid	 this	 problem.	Bartlett	 and	Gulati	 rightly	 highlight	 the	 relationship	between	 customer	 discrimination	 and	 firm	 discrimination,	 explaining	 how	customer	biases	lead	to	discrimination	by	the	firm,	and	how	firm	biases	lead	to	 discrimination	 by	 customers.30	 	 But	 because	 the	 interaction	 between	customer	discrimination	and	firm	behavior	is	so	deep,	so	many	things	that	an	employer	 does	 can	 either	 “curtail”	 or	 “facilitate	 discrimination	 by	 their	customers.”31	 To	 give	 just	 a	 few	 examples	 from	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati,	 a	 firm	could	 be	 liable	 under	 their	 proposal	 for	 failing	 to	 limit	 customers’	 access	 to	information	 about	 workers	 that	 could	 allow	 them	 to	 act	 on	 discriminatory	preferences;32	 for	 failing	 to	 change	 their	branding	and	advertising	strategies	that	promote	discriminatory	customer	preferences;33	or	 for	 failing	to	modify	their	 reliance	 on	 evaluation	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 biased	 customers	affect	 workers’	 employment	 prospects.34	 By	 contrast,	 in	 employment	discrimination	 cases,	 employer	 liability	 is	 typically	 limited	 to	 circumstances	where	 an	 employee	 suffers	 an	 adverse	 employment	 action	 due	 to	discrimination—termination,	 demotion,	 failure	 to	 hire	 or	 promote,	 or	 the	like.35	 Questions	 of	 employer	 liability	 outside	 of	 these	 circumstances	 have	raised	difficult	questions.36	Deciding	whether	and	when	the	employer	should	properly	 be	 liable	 in	 the	 types	 of	 circumstances	 catalogued	 above	would	 be	similarly	challenging.				
	 28.	 Id.	at	1279	 (citing	 studies	 showing	 “that	most	 individuals	 think	of	 discrimination	 as	 a	phenomenon	that	is	explicit”	and	“restricted	in	its	manifestations”).				 29.	 Bartlett	 &	 Gulati,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 248	 (“The	 problem	 is,	 rather,	 determining	 what	constitutes	discrimination	.	.	.	.”).			
	 30.	 Id.	
	 31.	 Id.	at	251.	
	 32.	 Id.	I	return	to	this	point	below.	See	infra	notes	50–56	and	accompanying	text.	
	 33.	 Id.	 at	 252–53.	 As	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 acknowledge,	 this	 may	 raise	 First	 Amendment	concerns.	Id.	at	235.	Although	these	are	not	foreign	to	antidiscrimination	law	(think	of	liability	for	sexual	harassment	based	 in	discriminatory	speech),	 they	are	heightened	under	a	 legal	standard	that	 divorces	 liability	 for	 discriminatory	 expression	 from	 a	 requirement	 that	 such	 expression	result	in	an	adverse	employment	action	or	the	equivalent.	
	 34.	 Id.	at	253.	
	 35.	 See,	 e.g.,	Beyer	 v.	 Cty.	 of	Nassau,	 524	 F.3d	160,	 166	 (2d	Cir.	 2008)	 (requiring	 adverse	employment	action	for	Title	VII	claim	to	proceed);	Jones	v.	Reliant	Energy—ARKLA,	336	F.3d	689,	692	(8th	Cir.	2003)	(requiring	the	same).	
	 36.	 See,	e.g.,	Harris	v.	Forklift,	510	U.S.	17,	21–23	(1993)	(addressing	when	a	sexually	hostile	environment	without	a	tangible	adverse	action	rises	to	the	level	of	a	Title	VII	violation);	Faragher	v.	City	of	Boca	Raton,	524	U.S.	775,	775	(1998)	(addressing	when	the	employer	should	be	liable	for	sexual	harassment	when	there	was	no	adverse	action	taken	by	the	employer).	
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2017]	 A	MODEST	PROPOSAL	 107	A	final	concern	about	relying	on	firm	liability	is	the	way	that	firms	might	react	 to	 such	 liability.	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 note	 that	 some	 firms,	 especially	those	 that	 connect	 workers	 and	 customers	 through	 online	 platforms,	 may	respond	 to	 liability	 by	 limiting	 customers’	 access	 to	 information	 about	workers	 that	 would	 allow	 customers	 to	 discriminate	 (e.g.,	 not	 making	workers’	race	or	sex	known	to	customers).37	In	a	manuscript	currently	under	development,	I	describe	this	type	of	action	by	firms,	and	increasingly	by	law,	as	a	move	towards	“ignorance	as	equality.”38	While	the	law	has	long	relied	on	certain	forms	of	ignorance	as	equality,39	there	has	been	a	turn	by	both	law	and	private	 actors	 to	 rely	 on	 ignorance	 to	 prevent	 discrimination.	 The	 type	 of	response	 that	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 imagine	 is	 enabled	 by	 technology:	 As	customers	 increasingly	 come	 to	 begin	 their	 interaction	 with	 firms	 and	workers	through	“apps”	and	other	online	mechanisms,	technology	can	be	used	to	ban	access	 to	 information	 that	would	allow	customers	 to	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	protected	traits.			While	ignorance	may	provide	a	short-term	prophylactic	against	customer	discrimination,	 and	 is	 a	 smart	 move	 by	 firms	 striving	 to	 avoid	 liability	 for	enabling	discrimination	by	 customers,	 it	 falls	 short	of	 the	 traditional	 goal	 of	antidiscrimination	 law.	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 assert	 that	 the	 “[a]im	 of	 anti-discrimination	law	is	to	change	how	individuals	act,	not	what	they	believe.”40	Others	 would	 disagree,	 and	 would	 view	 the	 role	 of	 law	 in	 this	 area	 as	 to	“change[]	hearts	and	minds.”41	Ignorance	as	equality	fails	to	achieve	this	end.	It	is	cynical	about	the	ability	to	change	discriminatory	attitudes,	and	operates	by	disabling	 such	 attitudes	 rather	 than	 challenging	 them.	 Firm	 liability	 here	may	 lead	 to	 efficient	mechanisms	 to	 reduce	 discrimination,	 but	 it	might	 not	achieve	 the	 ultimate	 ends	 of	 a	 greater	 transformation	 in	 societal	 attitudes.	Moreover,	 firms	denying	 access	 to	 information	 about	workers	 constructs	 an	impoverished	 view	 of	 the	 worker,	 which	 restricts	 the	 intimacy	 that	 occurs	within	so	many	customer–worker	interactions	and	is	part	of	what	makes	such	interactions	so	valuable.42			
		 37.	 Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	251.	
	 38.	 See	Naomi	Schoenbaum,	 Ignorance	as	Equality	 (unpublished	manuscript)	 (on	 file	with	author).	
	 39.	 See	 Naomi	 Schoenbaum,	 It’s	 Time	 That	 You	 Know:	 The	 Shortcomings	 of	 Ignorance	 as	
Fairness	 in	 Employment	 Law	 and	 the	 Need	 for	 an	 “Information-Shifting”	 Model,	 30	 HARV.	 J.L.	 &	GENDER	99,	100	(2007)	(discussing	limits	on	preemployment	inquiries).				 40.	 Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	238.				 41.	 Wendy	 Brown	 Scott,	 Transformative	 Desegregation:	 Liberating	 Hearts	 and	 Minds,	 2	 J.	GENDER,	RACE,	&	JUST.	315,	357	(1999).				 42.	 Schoenbaum,	supra	note	21,	at	1180–83.			
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108	 IOWA	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	102:nnn	III. HOLDING	FIRMS	ACCOUNTABLE	FOR	PRIVACY-BASED	BIASES	Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 suggest	 importing	 a	 BFOQ-like	 exception	 into	 their	proposal	for	firm	liability.43	Their	effort	to	account	for	the	interests	of	privacy	and	autonomy	offered	through	this	approach	is	commendable.	They	helpfully	attempt	 to	unpack	 the	 interest	 in	privacy	by	recognizing	 that	 this	 seemingly	singular	 interest	may	 be	motivated	 by	 a	multiplicity	 of	 interests	 that	might	each	be	entitled	to	a	different	level	of	deference.	For	instance,	they	note	that	“[a]	 massage	 therapist’s	 service,	 arguably,	 cannot	 be	 effectively	 performed	where	 the	 client	 does	 not	 feel	 comfortable,	 relaxed,	 and	 safe	 from	 sexual	threat.	 The	 same	 reasoning	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 preferences	 that	 result	 from	stereotypes	linking	sex	to	competence,	such	as	hospital	patients’	preferences	for	female	nurses	or	male	doctors.”44			I	would	urge	 slicing	 these	 interests	 even	more	 finely	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	law	both	 combats	 sex	 stereotypes	 and	polices	 employers’	 role	 in	 cultivating	discriminatory	customer	preferences.45	Bartlett	and	Gulati	state	that	“the	goal	should	 be	 to	 respect	 customer	 choices	 in	 especially	 personal	 settings	while	putting	continued	pressure	on	the	stereotypes	that	influence	those	choices	in	a	 biased	 way.”46	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 goal	 instead	 should	 be	 to	 respect	customer	 needs;	 otherwise	 we	 won’t	 be	 putting	 sufficient	 pressure	 on	stereotypes	that	influence	biased	choices.	For	instance,	in	the	example	above,	I	would	distinguish	between	general	 comfort-based	preferences	and	specific	safety	 concerns	 experienced	 by	 someone	 who	 has	 been	 a	 victim	 of	 sexual	trauma.	 As	 for	 the	 latter,	 these	 are	 the	 types	 of	 concerns	 that	 can	 be	documented,	and	can	be	 limited	to	a	certain	subset	of	persons,	such	that	the	law	can	accommodate	necessary	sex	preferences	while	still	strongly	pressing	against	sex	stereotypes.		Recognizing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 employer	 in	 discrimination	 by	 customers	 is	especially	 important	 in	 intimate	 work	 settings,	 where	 discriminatory	customer	preferences	can	appear	natural	rather	than	cultivated.47	As	Bartlett			 43.	 Bartlett	and	Gulati	state	that	“there	has	been	no	serious	attempt	to	weigh	the	strength	of	society’s	 present	 interest	 in	 preventing	 customers	 from	 discriminating	 .	.	.	 against	 society’s	present	commitment	to	personal	privacy	and	autonomy	for	 its	citizens.”	Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	 at	241.	But	we	have	 sometimes	done	 this	 through	Title	VII’s	BFOQ,	which	has	 required	courts	to	weigh	the	employer’s	argument	concerning	customer	preferences	against	the	strictures	of	antidiscrimination	law.	
	 44.	 Id.	 at	 244,	 246	 (“These	 are	 tough	 cases	 requiring	 especially	 creative	 strategies—strategies	 that	might	both	 take	account	of	 the	 ‘ordinary’	 case	 in	which	customer	discrimination	should	be	prevented,	if	possible,	and	cases	in	which	anti-discrimination	goals	might	be	best	met	by	allowing	sex-	or	race-based	decisions	by	customers.”).	
	 45.	 See	 Schoenbaum,	 supra	 note	 21,	 at	 1187–89.	 I	 am	 not	 alone	 in	 this	 argument.	 See	
generally	Amy	Kapczynski,	Note,	Same-Sex	Privacy	and	the	Limits	of	Antidiscrimination	Law,	112	YALE	L.J.	1257	(2003)	 (arguing	 that	customer	privacy	concerns	on	which	some	BFOQ	cases	rest	are	just	another	form	of	customer	preference).		 46.	 Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	244–45.			
	 47.	 See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	21,	at	1193–96.	
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2017]	 A	MODEST	PROPOSAL	 109	and	Gulati	 acknowledge,	 employers	 play	 a	 role	 in	 cultivating	 discriminatory	customer	 preferences.48	 	 This	 is	 no	 less	 true	 in	 intimate	 settings.49	 For	example,	one	court	has	 recognized	 that	a	 spa	perpetuated	customers’	biases	regarding	 the	 sex	 of	 their	 massage	 therapist	 by	 asking	 for	 their	 sex	preference.50	 The	 court	 found	 that	 the	 spa	 could	 have	 instead	 provided	customers	with	a	“description	of	the	therapists’	qualifications”	and	could	have	quelled	 privacy	 concerns	 by	 informing	 customers	 of	 draping	 policies	 and	telling	them	that	they	“can	instruct	therapists	about	where	they	may	and	may	not	 touch.”51	 Compounding	 this	 issue	 is	 that	 whenever	 firms	 accommodate	customers’	discriminatory	preferences,	 they	reinforce	customers’	preexisting	view	that	this	is	the	only	acceptable	way	these	services	may	be	delivered.	Such	privacy-based	preferences	thus	need	to	be	scrutinized	carefully	to	ensure	that	the	firm	is	not	playing	a	role	in	cultivating	the	preference.				It	is	difficult—and	perhaps	unwise—for	the	law	to	attempt	to	distinguish	between	 customer	 preferences	 in	 these	 intimate	 settings	 that	 are	 based	 in	malign	 “stereotypes	 linking	 sex	 to	 competence,	 such	 as	 .	.	.	 patients’	preferences	 for	 female	 nurses	 or	 male	 doctors,”52	 and	 benign	 stereotypes	linking	 sex	 to	 competence,	 such	 as	 patients’	 preferences	 for	 female	gynecologists.53	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati	 are	 clear	 that	 the	 former	 should	 be	rejected,	 but	 suggest	 that	 the	 latter	 might	 be	 accepted	 because	 “[a]fter	 a	history	 of	 male	 control	 over	 women’s	 reproductive	 lives,	 .	.	.	 many	 women	prefer	 female	 gynecologists,	 and	 believe	 that	 they	 receive	 better	 care	 from	them.”54			The	 law	 of	 sex	 discrimination,	 however,	 has	 urged	 caution	 around	 this	line	 of	 reasoning,	 given	 the	 history	 of	 harmful	 sex	 stereotyping	 based	 in	benign	 justifications.55	 Rejecting	 such	 preferences	 should	 not	 raise	 hackles	about	 customer	 autonomy,	 as	 such	 preferences	 are	 not	 fixed,	 but	 are	susceptible	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 law.	 Returning	 to	 the	 example	 of	 the	gynecologist,	 while	 women	 currently	 prefer	 female	 gynecologists,	 this	preference	arose	only	relatively	recently.56	Until	just	a	few	decades	ago,	when	gynecology	 was	 a	 male	 profession,	 women	 saw	male	 gynecologists	 without	complaint.	 This	 shift	 in	 preference	was	 prompted	 in	 large	 part	 by	 Title	 VII,	which	opened	up	the	medical	profession	to	women.		
		 48.	 Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	234–38.	
	 49.	 See	Schoenbaum,	supra	note	21,	at	1193–96.		 50.	 Olsen	v.	Marriott	Int’l,	Inc.,	75	F.	Supp.	2d	1052,	1066–74	(D.	Ariz.	1999).	
	 51.	 Id.	at	1072–73.		 52.	 Bartlett	&	Gulati,	supra	note	2,	at	244.	
	 53.	 Id.	at	246.	
	 54.	 Id.			
	 55.	 See	Frontiero	v.	Richardson,	411	U.S.	677,	684–88	(1973).	
	 56.	 See	Tamar	Lewin,	Women’s	Health	Is	No	Longer	a	Man’s	World,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Feb.	7,	2001),	http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/us/women-s-health-is-no-longer-a-man-s-world.html.	
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110	 IOWA	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	102:nnn	Moreover,	 privacy-based	 sex	 preferences	 rely	 on	 and	 reinforce	heteronormative	assumptions	that	are	increasingly	out	of	sync	with	Title	VII,	which	has	moved	toward	protecting	LGBT	employees.57	These	preferences	are	based	in	the	view	of	same-sex	spaces	as	no-sex	spaces,	that	is,	that	customers	can	 be	 comfortable	 that	 sex	 in	 general	 and	 that	 sexual	 threats	 in	 particular	will	 not	 be	 a	 problem	 so	 long	 as	 spaces	 remain	 sex	 segregated.58	 A	 law	crediting	customer	preferences	premised	in	a	sex	binary	is	increasingly	out	of	place	in	a	world	that	is	coming	to	accept	those	who	fall	outside	of	it.	The	need	to	 scrutinize	privacy-based	preferences	 closely	 is	 thus	all	 the	more	pressing	today.				 IV. CONCLUSION	This	 Response	 aimed	 to	 situate	 Bartlett	 and	 Gulati’s	 proposal	 within	current	antidiscrimination	law,	identifying	how	big	of	a	departure	such	a	shift	in	the	 law	would	represent,	what	challenges	 it	might	pose,	and	how	it	might	not	 go	 far	 enough	 in	 challenging	 the	 role	 of	 employers	 in	 cultivating	discriminatory	customer	preferences	in	the	context	of	intimate	work.		While	I	conclude	 that	 their	proposal	would	mark	a	significant	shift	 in	 the	 law,	 I	also	conclude	that	this	is	no	weakness	of	their	proposal.		Rather,	their	cataloguing	of	the	ways	that	employers	cultivate	and	reinforce	discriminatory	preferences	should	 be	 considered	 in	 other	 contexts,	 and	 should	 be	 recognized	 as	extending	even	to	the	most	intimate	of	work	settings.			
	
	 57.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Smith	 v.	 City	 of	 Salem,	 378	 F.3d	 566,	 574–75	 (6th	 Cir.	 2004)	 (holding	 that	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	transgender	identity	constitutes	sex	discrimination	under	Title	VII);	Rene	v.	MGM	Grand	Hotel,	Inc.,	305	F.3d	1061,	1068–69	(9th	Cir.	2002)	(Pregerson,	J.,	concurring)	(explaining	that	sexual	harassment	of	a	gay	male	plaintiff	is	sex	discrimination	because	the	man	was	harassed	for	failing	to	meet	masculine	stereotypes).	The	EEOC	has	recently	determined	that	discrimination	on	 the	basis	of	 transgender	 identity	and	sexual	orientation	both	 fall	within	Title	VII’s	ban	on	sex	discrimination,	and	some	courts	have	followed	suit.	Hively	v.	Ivy	Tech	Cmty.	Coll.	of	Ind.,	853	F.3d	339,	351–52	(7th	Cir.	2017)	(“We	hold	only	that	a	person	who	alleges	that	she	experienced	 employment	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 her	 sexual	 orientation	 has	 put	 forth	 a	case	of	 sex	discrimination	 for	Title	VII	purposes.”);	EEOC	v.	 Scott	Med.	Health	Ctr.,	P.C.,	No.	16-225,	2016	WL	6569233	(W.D.	Pa.	Nov.	4,	2016)	(agreeing	with	the	EEOC	interpretation),	Isaacs	v.	Felder	Servs.,	LLC,	143	F.	Supp.	3d	1190,	1193	(M.D.	Ala.	2015)	(same).		 58.	 Schoenbaum,	supra	note	21,	at	1191–92;	see	also	Naomi	Schoenbaum,	Heteronormativity	
in	Employment	Discrimination	Law,	WASHBURN	L.J.	(forthcoming	2017).			
